Probate Law by King, Jason T.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 50 





Jason T. King 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jason T. King, Probate Law, 50 S. C. L. Rev. 965 (1999). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
PROBATE LAW
LIFETIME REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF
A CONTRACT TO MAKE A WILL
I. INTRODUCTION
A contract to make a will is a common device by which an individual
promises to will property to a friend or relative if that friend or relative will
perform services during the individual's lifetime. These services can include
taking care of property, running a business while the individual is
incapacitated, or caring for an individual during old age.' This type of
arrangement is a valid, enforceable contract.2
Although many people may feel morally obligated to help a loved one
or friend during old age, this arrangement can generate numerous problems.
The problems usually begin when the relationship between the parties
deteriorates. A family member may have devoted years to caring for an elderly
relative in expectation of land or personal property only to be disinherited
because of a subsequent disagreement. Additional problems occur when a party
sues for breach of contract. Because a contract to make a will contains elements
of both contract and testamentary law, it is sometimes difficult for a court to
fashion a remedy-particularly when the promisor is still alive.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals recently applied an unusual
1. See, e.g., Wright v. Patrick, 262 S.C. 434, 437, 205 S.E.2d 175, 176 (1974)
(involving a grandmother's promise to will property to her granddaughter in return for the
granddaughter's promise to care for her grandmother and to help her in her business); Footman
v. Sweat, 247 S.C. 172, 176, 146 S.E.2d 624,626 (1966) (per curiam) (involving a grand aunt's
promise to will property to her grand niece in return for the niece's promise to take care of her
aunt and to provide for her until death); Brown v. Graham, 242 S.C. 491,492, 131 S.E.2d 421,
422 (1963) (involving a father's promise to will his 145-acre farm to his illegitimate sons in
return for their promise to "operate his farm or assist him if he became ill and to help him in the
conduct of his business generally"); Kerr v. Kennedy, 105 S.C. 496, 498, 90 S.E. 177, 177
(1916) (involving a mother's promise to will property to her sons in return for their promise to
"live near by or with her, take care of her during her lifetime, manage her property for her, and
give her all the care and attention which she might require"); see also Ozgur K. Bayazitoglu,
Comment, Applying Realistic StatutoryInterpretation to Texas Probate Code § 59A-Contracts
Concerning Succession, 33 Hous. L. REv. 1175, 1179 (1996) ("Typically, a contract to make a
will is predicated on the following exchange: The testatorpromises to devise property to another
in exchange for a promise that the testator will be taken care of for life."); Amy Sapper Poling,
Comment, Protecting the Interests of Children ofDivorce: A Proposal to Create Exceptions to
the Louisiana Prohibition Against Contracting for Future Successions, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1853,
1868 (1998) ("One of the most controversial [types of contracts to make a will] involves
contracts with the elderly for services or companionship.").
2. Caulder v. Knox, 251 S.C. 337, 344, 162 S.E.2d 262, 266 (1968); BERTEL M.
SPARKS, CONTRACrS TO MAKE WILLS 1-2 (1956).
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remedy for a breach of a contract to make a will in Wright v. Trask.' The case
is unusual for two reasons. First, the suit was brought during the testator's
lifetime.' Second, the court ordered the defendant to make a will conforming
to the contract with questionable supporting authority and in opposition to
established common-law principles.'
Part II of this Note outlines the facts and holding of Wright. Part III
discusses contracts to make a will in general, examines the traditional remedies
available for breach of a contract to make a will, and demonstrates that the
remedy applied in Wright is susceptible to strong criticism. Instead of
compelling the promisor to make a will, the court should have considered
placing a constructive trust on the property in favor of the promisee.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF WRIGHT . TRASK
Neil Trask owned a cattle ranch in Abbeville, South Carolina, and
desired to pass his ranch and knowledge of cattle breeding to someone else
before he died. In 1983 he asked his grandson, James Wright, Jr., to move to
the ranch and learn the art of cattle breeding.7 In return, Trask promised his
grandson that the ranch would be Wright's after Trask died.' Wright, who was
planning to take over his family's "thriving" meat packing business with his
stepbrother, agreed to quit his job at the meat packing plant and to move with
his family to his grandfather's ranch.9
Wright managed the ranch for over twelve years.'0 He made many
improvements, such as repairing fences, and learned from his grandfather how
to improve the herd." Wright worked for low wages, sometimes working "from
sunup to sundown, seven days a week."'2 By all accounts he did an excellent
job managing the ranch. 3 Trask often would publicly boast how well his
grandson managed the ranch.' He executed several wills, leaving increasing
3. 329 S.C. 170,495 S.E.2d 222 (Ct. App. 1997).
4. Id. at 173, 495 S.E.2d at 223. See generally Coleman Karesh, Wills, 8 S.C. L.Q.
150, 157 (1955) ("The usual case involves action by the disappointed promisee after the
promisor has died."). For another case brought during the lifetime of the promisor, see Harmon
v. Aughtry, 226 S.C. 371, 85 S.E.2d 284 (1955).
5. See Wright, 329 S.C. at 183-84,495 S.E.2d at 229; infra note 43 and accompanying
text (discussing the established principle that a person cannot be forced to make a will); infra
notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing the authorities cited in Wright and how these
authorities do not support compelling a party to make a will).
6. Wright, 329 S.C. at 173,495 S.E.2d at 224.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 176, 495 S.E.2d at 225.
9. Id. at 173-74, 495 S.E.2d at 224.
10. Id. at 182, 495 S.E.2d at 228.
11. Id. at 174, 495 S.E.2d at 224.
12. Id.
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amounts of the ranch to Wright."5 In 1991 he revised his will leaving all the
cattle, land, and equipment to Wright.
16
After Trask's health began to decline in 1994, his grandson took
control of the ranch.'7 Wright's wife also devoted time caring for Trask's
needs."8 When Trask became unhappy with the way Wright was running the
ranch, he fired his grandson and changed his will to disinherit him.' 9 Wright
subsequently brought a suit against his grandfather seeking damages and
claimed his grandfather breached their oral contract to make a will.2"
A master-in-equity from the Circuit Court of Anderson County
concluded Trask should specifically perform the contract by executing and not
revoking a will leaving the cattle, land, and equipment to his grandson.2' The
master also enjoined Trask from transferring or encumbering any of the subject
property. 22 Finally, the master ordered that Wright return as manager of the
ranch.' The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.24
III. ANALYSIS
A. Pre-Probate Code Common Law
According to common law, a contract to make a will is an enforceable
contract right.' However, two separate entities are involved: a contract and a
will.26 This combination has been the source of much confusion.27 To be
enforceable, a contract to make a will must contain all of the following
essential contractual elements: a contractual intent, ameeting oftheminds, and
15. Id. at 174-75, 495 S.E.2d at 224.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 175, 495 S.E.2d at 224.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 175, 495 S.E.2d at 224-25.
20. Id. at 173, 495 S.E.2d at 223.
21. Id. at 170, 173, 495 S.E.2d at 222, 223.
22. Id. at 173, 495 S.E.2d at 223.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 173, 495 S.E.2d at 224.
25. Corontzes v. Trapalis, 259 S.C. 244, 249, 191 S.E.2d 523, 525 (1972); Caulder
v. Knox, 251 S.C. 337, 344, 162 S.E.2d 262, 266 (1968); SPARKS, supra note 2, at 1 ("As early
as 1682 the validity of a contract to leave property at death of the promisor was accepted without
question."); id. at 2 ("'No proposition is better settled than that a contract to leave by will is
good."' (quoting Walpole v. Orford, 30 Eng. Rep. 1076, 1081 (1797))); GEORGEW. THOMPSON,
THELAW OF WILLS § 16, at 32 (3d ed. 1947).
26. S. Alan Medlin, Result-Oriented Interpretations of the South Carolina Probate
Code Create Estate of Confusion, 44 S.C. L. REv. 287, 339-40 (1993); Poling, supra note 1, at
1868; John E. Johnston, Jr., Recent Case, 7 S.C. L.Q. 656, 656 (1955).
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valid mutual consideration.28 The contract does not have to fulfill the
requirements of a valid will."
However, a heightened burden of proof is required to establish an oral
contract to make a will.30 A contract to make a will must be established by
"clear, cogent, and convincing evidence."' This high burden of proof is
required for several reasons. First, the right to make a will and to dispose of
property is fundamental.32 Second, if the contract is an oral contract it is more
difficult for the court to ascertain what the terms of the contract are and
whether the contract actually exists.33 The evidence must carry an "irresistable
conviction to the mind that such a contract actually existed."'34 Finally, the
promisor may be deceased, making the existence of the contract more difficult
to determine.35
B. South Carolina Probate Code Section 62-2-701
In 1987 the enactment of the South Carolina Probate Code changed the
common law of contracts to make wills by eliminating oral contracts.36 Section
28. Wright, 329 S.C. at 176, 495 S.E.2d at 225; Corontzes, 259 S.C. at 249, 191
S.E.2d at 525; Caulder, 251 S.C. at 344, 162 S.E.2d at 266; Brown v. Graham, 242 S.C. 491,
493, 131 S.E.2d 421, 422 (1963); Baylor v. Bath, 189 S.C. 269, 270-71, 1 S.E.2d 139, 140
(1938); THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 16, at 34.
29. THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 16, at 34 ("The agreement need not be executed with
the formalities of a will.").
30. Wright, 329 S.C. at 176, 495 S.E.2d at 225; Corontzes, 259 S.C. at 249, 191
S.E.2d at 526; Caulder, 251 S.C. at 345, 162 S.E.2d at 266; Young v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 12, 32
S.E.2d 889, 893 (1945); see Footman v. Sweat, 247 S.C. 172, 177, 146 S.E.2d 624, 627 (1966)
(per curiam); Hayes v. Israel, 242 S.C. 497, 500, 131 S.E.2d 506, 507 (1963); Brown, 242 S.C.
at 493, 131 S.E.2d at 422; Dicks v. Cassels, 100 S.C. 341,348, 84 S.E. 878, 879 (1915).
31. Havird v. Schissell, 251 S.C. 416,418, 162 S.E.2d 877, 878 (1968) ('This court
has held in cases too numerous to mention that when an oral contract to make a will is relied
upon, it is necessary that such contract be established by clear, cogent and convincing evidence
which carries irresistible conviction to the mind that such a contract actually existed .... ).
32. Kerr v. Kennedy, 105 S.C. 496, 500, 90 S.E. 177, 178 (1916); ef. Lowe v.
Ficlding, 207 S.C. 442, 447, 36 S.E.2d 293, 294 (1945) ("A will is not a contract but a mere
expression of intention to take effect after testator's death and subject in the meantime to
revocation or such changes as the maker may deem expedient."); Dicks, 100 S.C. at 348-49,84
S.E. at 879 ("It is a fixed principle of law that a will is revocable whenever the maker desires to
change.").
33. See Dicks, 100 S.C. at 349-50, 84 S.E. at 879 ("'Such a contract, especially when
it is attempted to be established byparol, is regarded with suspicion and not sustained, except
upon the strongest evidence that it was founded upon valuable consideration and deliberately
entered into by the decedent."' (quoting McKeegan v. O'Neill, 22 S.C. 454, 468 (1884)
(emphasis added))).
34. Havird, 251 S.C. at 418, 162 S.E.2d at 878.
35. Dicks, 100 S.C. at 350, 84 S.E. at 879 ("'The evidence comes from the living
againstthe dead, who cannot speak inhis own behalf...."' (quoting Wilson v. Gordon, 73 S.C.
155, 160, 53 S.E. 79, 81 (1905))).








A contract to make a will or devise, or to
revoke a will or devise, or not to revoke a
will or devise, or to die intestate, ifexecuted
after the effective date of this act, can be
established only by (1) provisions of a will
of the decedent stating material provisions
of the contract; (2) an express reference in
a will of the decedent to a contract and
extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the
contract; or (3) a writing signed by the
decedent evidencing the contract and
extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the
contract. The execution of a joint will or
mutual wills does not create a presumption
of a contract not to revoke the will or
wills.
37
In Wright the court concluded that section 62-2-701 did not apply because
Wright and Trask entered the contract in 1983, when Wright agreed to move
to his grandfather's ranch.38 The court stated that the Probate Code's enactment
in 1987 did not affect contracts entered into before that date.39 If section 62-2-
701 had applied in Wright, the contract would not have met the requirements
of this statute and would have been unenforceable.' Currently, no reported
South Carolina case has applied section 62-2-701. 4'
37. S.C. CODEANN. § 62-2-701(emphasis added).
38. 329 S.C. 170, 180-81, 495 S.E.2d 222, 227-28 (Ct. App. 1997).
39. Id. To support this decision the court quoted section 62-1-100(4) of the Probate
Code, which states: "[A]n act done before the effective date in any proceeding and any accrued
right is not impaired by this Code." S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-100(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
However, using section 62-1-100(4) as authority seems unnecessary given that section 62-2-701
itself states that it applies only to contracts "executed after the effective date of this act." Id.
§ 62-2-701 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
40. See Wright, 329 S.C. at 180,495 S.E.2d at 227 ("Wright readily admits the oral
contract to make a will does not meet the legal requirements of Probate Code section 62-2-
701.").
41. The South Carolina Court of Appeals ignored this statute in a recent case where
it obviously applied. A wife promised her husband that she would not exercise the power of
appointment contained in her husband's will, so that a trust would pass to his family. After the
husband's death, she changed her will, leaving the trust to her family. The court enforced the
promise, determining that a fiduciary relationship existed between the husband and wife and that
the wife had violated her fiduciary duty to her husband. Chapman v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank,
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C. Remedies
The problem with providing a remedy for contracts to make wills
stems from their dual character: they possess elements of both contract and
testamentary law.42 It is a well-established principle that people have the right
to leave property to whom they wish, and people cannot be forced to make or
revoke wills 3 However, the right being enforced in a contract to make a will
is a contract right." Many problems stem from the tension between these two
aspects.4 The Wright court confused the dual elements of a contract to make
a will, leading to the inappropriate remedy of compelling Trask to make a
will.46
1. Remedies After the Promisor's Death
Most suits in this area of the law occur after the death of the
promisor.' Both legal and equitable remedies are available for breaches of
these contracts. With a legal remedy, aparty receives monetary compensation
for certain injuries.4 9Two legal remedies are available. First, the promisee can
bring an action against the personal representative for breach of contract to
42. See Poling, supra note 1, at 1868; Johnston, supra note 26, at 656.
43. Dicks v. Cassels, 100 S.C. 341,348-49, 84 S.E. 878, 879 (1915) ("A person has
a right ordinarily to leave his property to whom he pleases .... It is a fixed principle of law that
a will is revocable whenever the maker desires to change."); Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60, 71, 35
S.E. 415, 419 (1900) ("[A]ny testamentary instrument is, by its nature, revocable .... );
THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 48, at 217 (2d ed. 1953) ("[T]he
general view [is] that equity will not order [the] promisor to execute a will in accordance with
the contract."); THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 16, at 36 ("Most courts hold that under such
contracts the promisor can not be compelled to execute a will, nor can he be prevented from
revoking one, since the contract is not treated as rendering an existing will irrevocable or as
depriving the promisor of his legal testamentary rights."); Medlin, supra note 26, at 340
("According to trust and estate law, a competent testator maintains the right to make, amend, or
revoke a will until death."); Johnston, supra note 26, at 657 ("[E]quity will compel no one to
make a will. . . ."); 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance § 207 (1977) ("[Ihe court will not and
cannot compel the testator to execute the promised vill .... ).
44. SPARKS, supra note 2, at 194 ("The important consideration to keep in mind is that
whether the proceeding is at law or in equity the right being enforced is a right arising out of
contract."); THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 16, at 35 ("Generally speaking, the validity of such
contracts is determined by the ordinary law of contracts."); Bayazitoglu, supra note 1, at 1184.
45. See SPARKS, supra note 2, at 195; Poling, supra note 1, at 1868.
46. See SPARKS, supra note 2, at 96-97; id. at 127-28 ("Any attempt to affirmatively
compel the execution of a will would appear destined to certain failure because of the inherent
difficulties involved in compelling such an act....").
47. ATKiNSON, supra note 43, at 217; Karesh, supra note 4, at 157; see, e.g.,
Corontzes v. Trapalis, 259 S.C. 244, 248, 191 S.E.2d 523, 525 (1972) (Moss, J., dissenting);
Brown v. Graham, 242 S.C. 491,494, 131 S.E.2d 421,422 (1963).
48. See generally SPARKS, supra note 2, at 135-61 (discussing legal and equitable
remedies for breach of a contract to make a will).
49. See IA C.J.S. Actions § 124 (1985).
(Vol. 50: 965
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recover the value of what was promised.5 ° Second, an alternative remedy of
quantum meruit is available to recover thb value of the services performed by
the promisee.5 An equity court, however, is better suited for handling contracts
to make a will, and usually courts apply equitable remedies.52 The main reason
that courts apply equitable remedies in suits involving contracts to make wills
seems to be the inadequacy of a remedy at law.53 In equity, a court has wide
discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy under the particular
circumstances.54 The most common remedy when a promisor dies intestate or
with a will not conforming to the contract is the equitable remedy of specific
performance.5 5
In a remedy of specific performance, the court compels a party to
perform a contract.5 6 When enforcing a contract to make a will, however, the
remedy is not true specific performance because the promisor is dead and
cannot be forced to do anything.57 Rather, it is quasi-specific performance or
relief in the nature of specific performance.58 The remedy of quasi-specific
performance reconciles "the differing goals of the laws of wills and
contracts."5 9 Traditionally, a testator has the right to either make whatever will
he chooses during his lifetime or die intestate.' If a promisor dies intestate, or
without a will conforming to the contract, equity will enforce the contract in the
form of a constructive trust6" against the testator's heirs, ensuring the promisee
receives what is deserved.62
50. ATKiNSON, supra note 43, at 218.
51. Id.
52. SPARKS, supra note 2, at 136-37; id. at 146 ("[T]he bulk of the litigation in this
field is found in chancery."). Some courts simply apply a general rule that equitable remedies
apply to contracts to make a will. See Kerr v. Kennedy, 105 S.C. 496, 500, 90 S.E. 177, 178
(1916) ("There is no doubt that a contract of the character alleged in the pleadings in this case
... will be enforced by a Court of equity."); Wright v. Trask, 329 S.C. 170, 183-84, 495 S.E.2d
222, 229 (Ct. App. 1997).
53. See SPARKS, supra note 2, at 150.
54. IA CJ.S. Actions § 124 (1985).
55. Wright, 329 S.C. at 183-84, 495 S.E.2d at 229. However, the court in Wright
misunderstood specific performance when applied to contracts to make wills. See infra notes 56-
62 and accompanying text.
56. 81 CJ.S. Specific Performance § 2 (1977) ("Specific performance [is] an
equitable remedy which compels the performance of a contract in the precise terms agreed on,
or such a substantial performance as will do justice between the parties under the
circumstances.") (footnte omitted).
57. Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60, 71, 35 S.E. 415,418-19 (1900); 1 WILLIAM J. BOWE
&DOUGLAsH. PARKER, PAGE ONTHELAWOFWILLS § 10.30, at 504(1960); COLEMANKARESH,
WILLS 56 (1977); Johnston, supra note 26, at 657.
58. Johnston, supra note 26, at 657.
59. Medlin, supra note 26, at 340.
60. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
62. Bruce, 57 S.C. at 71, 35 S.E. at 419; Medlin, supra note 26, at 340 ("TIMhe
compromise between the two policies is to probate whatever will, if any, was last executed by
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2. Remedies During the Promisor's Life63
As previously mentioned, most suits in this area of the law occur after
the promisor's death." Courts are faced with different problems when a suit is
brought during the testator's lifetime. The remedy of quasi-specific
performance is not available because it applies only after the testator's death.65
In Wright v. Trask the promisee, Wright, sued for breach of contract during the
lifetime of the promisor, Trask.66 However, the court failed to make any explicit
mention of this important aspect of the case. The court also failed to mention
a South Carolina case, Harmon v. Aughtry, that established precedent for suits
brought during a promisor's lifetime.67 The law and the remedies are different
when a suit is brought during a promisor's lifetime.
Most courts are reluctant to recognize a cause of action during a
promisor's lifetime because the promisor has not breached the contract until
death and because the promisor cannot be compelled to make a will.6"
However, both legal and equitable remedies are available in some
circumstances. 69 With a remedy at law, a plaintiff seeks "immediate redress for
the wrong of the defendant."7 In Harmon the South Carolina Supreme Court
recognized the legal remedy of anticipatory breach of a contract to make a will
during the testator's lifetime.7 The court stated:
Since no breach of a contract of this kind
can be assured as long as the promisor lives,
ordinarily no cause of action accrues until
his death. A will in accordance with the
contractual obligation may be made at any
time during the life of the promisor.
However... if in his lifetime the promisor
repudiates the agreement, or puts it out of
his power to perform, as by a conveyance of
constructive trust.").
63. For a more detailed discussion of different legal and equitable remedies that states
have applied during the promisor's lifetime in contracts to make wills, see H.A. Wood,
Annotation, Remedies During Promisor's Lifetime on Contract to Convey or Will Property at
Death in Consideration of Support or Services, 7 A.L.R.2d 1166 (1949).
64. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
66. 329 S.C. 170, 175, 495 S.E.2d 222, 225 (Ct. App. 1997).
67. 226 S.C. 371, 85 S.E.2d 284 (1955).
68. Estate of Housely v. Haywood, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628, 637 (Ct. App. 1997);
Harmon, 226 S.C. at 375, 85 S.E.2d at 285; Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60,71, 35 S.E. 415,418-19
(1900); ATKINSON, supra note 43, at 219; Karesh, supra note 4, at 158; Johnston, supra note 26,
at 656.
69. See Wood, supra note 63, at 1166.
70. SPARKS, supra note 2, at 85.
71. 226 S.C. at 375, 85 S.E.2d at 285-86.
[Vol. 50: 965
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the property involved to a third person, such
conduct may be treated as an anticipatory
breach and an action for. appropriate relief
may be immediately maintained by the
promisee against the promisor.72
Other states similarly have allowed a cause of action during the lifetime of the
promisor based on anticipatory breach of contract.73
With an equitable remedy, "the plaintiff is usually seeking the aid of
the court to protect an interest in particular assets whose conveyance to him is
due at a future time." 4 Courts will enforce the equitable remedy of an
injunction to restrain the inter vivos transfer of property subject to the
contract.75 Courts have also granted injunctions allowing the promisee to
continue performing contractual obligations.76 In addition, a court can place a
constructive trust on the property during the lifetime of the promisor.
7
In Wright v. Trask the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the
master's order requiring specific performance of the contract to will by the
promisor.78 This remedy was not quasi-specific performance, but actual specific
performance.79 The Court of Appeals ordered the defendant to make and not
revoke a will leaving property to the plaintiff.0 This is an unusual remedy."1 In
addition, the authority relied upon for this decision does not support compelling
a promisor to make a will.82 These authorities support quasi-specific
performance" and are contrary to the decision in Wright."
72. Id. (citations omitted); see also Battuello v. Battuello, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 550
(CL App. 1998) (allowing a cause of action during the testator's lifetime "where the promisor
has made an inter vivos transfer of property specifically covered by the contract").
73. See Spinks v. Jenkins, 43 S.E.2d 586, 586-87 (Ga. Ct. App. 1947); Carter v.
Witherspoon, 126 So. 388,389 (Miss. 1930); Lipe v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 178 S.E. 665,
666 (N.C. 1935).
74. SPARKS, supra note 2, at 85.
75. ATKINSON, supra note 43, at 216-17; KARESH, supra note 57, at 56-57.
76. Wood, supra note 63, at 1179.
77. ATKiNSON, supra note 43, at 216-17; Wood, supra note 63, at 1181-84.
78. 329 S.C. 170, 173, 495 S.E.2d 222, 223-24 (Ct. App. 1997).
79. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
80. Wright, 329 S.C. at 173, 495 S.E.2d at 223.
81. See SPARKS, supra note 2, at 128-29; Johnston, supra note 26, at 658. In an earlier
decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court mentioned in dicta that a promisor may be
"precluded" from making a will not in conformity with the contract. Exparte Hineline, 166 S.C.
352, 362, 164 S.E. 887, 891 (1932).
82. The court in Wright cited the following authority: 1 BOwE & PARKER, supra note
57, § 10.30, at 504; KARESH, supra note 57, at 56; THOMPSON, supra note 25, at 28. See Wright,
329 S.C. at 183-84, 495 S.E.2d at 229.
83. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
84. One authority discusses remedies during the lifetime of the testator, but this
source mentions (1) an injunction to restrain an inter vivos transfer of the subject property, (2)
an action for damages at law for anticipatory breach, and (3) an action for restitution. KARBSH,
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Compelling a promisor to make a will conforming to a contract is not
an appropriate remedy for breaching a contract to make a will. Even though a
court of equity has broad powers in fashioning a remedy, 5 there is
overwhelming support that a court of equity cannot compel a person to make
or revoke a will. 6 By compelling Trask to make a will, the South Carolina
court has added to the confusion in this area of the law. According to
Professor Sparks:
Neither an action for an affmnative
injunction to compel the execution of an
appropriate will nor an action to enjoin the
execution of an inconsistent will or to
prevent the revocation of a will already
executed should be entertained. Even if
relief of this type is granted it is incapable
of enforcement and cannot give the
promisee any effective protection.88
Although the result seems fair in Wright, this same result could have
been accomplished without focusing on the will itself.89 In cases like Wright,
57. Another authority cited by the court refers to an action of quasi-specific performance and
offers no support for compelling a promisor to make a will. 1 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 57,
§ 10.30, at 504 ("It is, of course, not technical specific performance, since there is no attempt to
compel the promisor to make a will."). Yet another authority cited by the court is also contrary
to the decision. THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 16, at 28 ("Most courts hold that under such
contracts the promisor can not be compelled to execute a will, nor can he be prevented from
revoking one, since the contract is not treated as rendering an existing will irrevocable or as
depriving the promisor of his legal testamentary rights.").
85. Wood, supra note 63, at 1169 ('[Clourts of equity are not bound to give any
stereotyped form of relief. They readily adapt the relief to the peculiar facts of the case, and their
sole concern is that the decree entered shall effectuatejustice."' (quoting Chantland v. Sherman,
125 N.W. 871, 874 (Iowa 1910))).
86. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Wood, supra note 63, at 1169
("[A] court of equity [is] without the power to compel a person to execute a will .. .
87. See SPARKS, supra note 2, at 194-95.
88. Id. at 195 (footnote omitted).
89. As stated by Professor Sparks:
[rlt should be noted that the relief available depends
upon the usual principles of contract law, and the fact
that the thing bargained for is the making of a will
does not within itself give any special significance to
the transaction. The substance of the thing agreed
upon is the transfer of property to the promisee at the
death of the promisor. The remedy granted by the
courts seeks either to accomplish that result or to
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the court is enforcing a contract right," and the contract stated that Wright
would get the ranch, cattle, and equipment when Trask died if Wright came to
live on the ranch.9 The court also stated that Trask's subsequent wills
disinheriting Wright, made after he entered into his contract with Wright, were
breaches for which Wright could have brought suit.92 This is completely
contrary to the established principle that promisors have their entire lifetime to
perform their side of the testamentary bargain. 9a
The court could have considered the grandfather's actions in Wright
to be an anticipatory repudiation, because he fired his grandson.94 The South
Carolina Supreme Court ruled in Harmon v. Aughtry that if a promisor
repudiates a contract, the promisee can obtain immediate relief.95 Trask's
revocation of the will conforming to the contract would probably not be
anticipatory repudiation because Trask would have the rest of his life to rewrite
the will in accordance with the contract.96 However, firing Wright could be a
clear indication that Trask repudiated the contract. But the Wright court did not
cite Harmon, nor did the court mention anticipatory repudiation.
Several alternative remedies were available to the court in Wright. The
court could have denied equitable relief and awarded money damages for
anticipatory breach of contract.97 However, relief at law is granted only when
the remedy is "clear, adequate, and complete."98 In Wright a remedy at law
would not have been adequate because estimating the value of Wright's
services would be difficult, and money damages could not replace the unique
character of the ranch, equipment, and cattle promised to Wright.9
As the court noted in Wright, equitable, not legal, remedies are usually
awarded to a promisee in a contract to make a will.00 Two equitable remedies
available during the promisor's lifetime are an injunction and a constructive
trust.' The court in Wright awarded injunctive relief to the promisee,
Wright. °2 The court enjoined Trask from "alienating, encumbering or
90. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
91. Wright v. Trask, 329 S.C. 170, 177,495 S.E.2d 222, 226 (Ct. App. 1997).
92. Id. at 180, 495 S.E.2d at 227.
93. See Harmon v. Aughtry, 226 S.C. 371,375,85 S.E.2d 284,285 (1955); see also
supra note 43 and accompanying text.
94. Wright, 329 S.C. at 175, 495 S.E.2d at 225.
95. Harmon, 226 S.C. at 375, 85 S.E.2d at 285-86.
96. It is unclear exactly what would constitute repudiation. Conveying property
subject to a contract to will to a third party is given as one example in Harmon. Id.
97. KARESH, supra note 57, at 57; Wood, supra note 63, at 1190-96.
98. 1 BowE & PARKER, supra note 57, § 10.35, at 516.
99. See id. § 10.35, at 514-16 (stating that relief in equity is usually granted when a
conveyance of property is involved and where one person has devoted a great amount of time
and energy rendering personal services to another).
100. 329 S.C. 170, 183, 495 S.E.2d 222, 229 (Ct. App. 1997).
101. Wood, supra note 63, at 1168.
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disposing of any of the real estate."' 3 More importantly, the court ordered
Wright to return as manager of the ranch."' Other courts have also applied this
type of injunctive relief.0 5 According to one commentator, "courts... have
granted injunctive relief to maintain the status quo and permit the promisee to
continue in the performance of his contract and to restrain the promisor...
from disposing of the property in violation of the contract."'"
It appears the Wright court ordered Trask to make a will to ensure that
Wright's interest in the property would be protected. A constructive trust
placed upon the ranch for the benefit of Wright, however, seems to be a more
appropriate remedy and less likely to create confusion in this area of the law.
A constructive trust is a creation of the courts where a "holder of legal title is
held to be a trustee for the benefit of another who in good conscience is entitled
to the beneficial interest."' 07 A constructive trust is "not a trust in which the
trustee is to have duties of administration lasting for an appreciable period of
time, but rather a passive, temporary trust, in which the trustee's sole duty is to
transfer the title and possession to the beneficiary." ' 8 Other courts have
awarded relief in the form of a constructive trust to protect the interests of the
promisee when a promisor breaches a contract to make a will."° Had the
Wright court used this remedy, it would have allowed Trask to stay on the farm
for the rest of his life and would have adequately protected Wright's interest in
the property. The remedy of a constructive trust would have provided greater
protection of Wright's interest than the remedy of compelling Trask to make
a will. Wright could always make a secret will or could secretly revoke the
conforming will. A court of equity simply does not have the ability to enforce
a remedy of this kind."'
Although, considering the facts, the result seems fair in Wright, the
more traditional remedy of a constructive trust placed upon the property for the
benefit of the promisee would have achieved the same result as compelling the
promisor to make a will, without creating as many problems."' The important
point is that if a valid contract exists, promisees should receive the property to
which they are entitled."'
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Wood, supra note 63, at 1178-81; 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance § 207
(1977).
106. Wood, supra note 63, at 1179.
107. 89 CJ.S. Trusts § 139, at 1015 (1955). See generally GEORGEGLEASONBOGERT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRusTs § 77, at 287-90 (5th ed. 1973) (explaining constructive
trusts).
108. BOGERT, supra note 107, § 77, at 288.
109. See, e.g., Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 102 A. 106, 107 (Me. 1917); Matheson v.
Gullickson, 24 N.W.2d 704,709-10 (Minn. 1946); Wood, supra note 63, at 1181-84.
110. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The remedy in Wright v. Trask has the potential to cause more
confusion in an already difficult area of the law. The court enforced a contract
to make a will during the promisor's lifetime without discussing that most
courts do not allow suits during the promisor's lifetime and without mentioning
South Carolina precedent regarding suits brought during the testator's lifetime.
The court also compelled a promisor to make and not revoke a will, which is
contrary to established principles of law. The authorities given to support this
decision are unpersuasive-and even contradictory to the court's resolution.
Placing a constructive trust on the property for the benefit of Wright would
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